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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
it, but we must wait for the ruling on each set of facts as it is presented.
It is suggested, on the basis of present decisions, that in carrying
out the liquidation and sale by the stockholders, the liquidation should
be effected, if at all possible, before any definitive negotiating takes place.
It should be done as soon as the idea to sell is conceived in order to
prevent a holding that any part of the negotiations was corporate action.
If the negotiations do take place before liquidation, they should be car-
ried on in behalf of the stockholders by someone who is not an officer
of the corporation.14 When the assets are transferred to an agent for
the stockholders, care should be taken that the corporation or the board
of directors, as a body, has no hand in the appointment of such agent,
but rather that a stockholder's petition or consent should be obtained
appointing him.' 5
There should be a complete vesting of title to the assets in the stock-
holders before the sale takes place. It has been held that payment of a
corporate debt out of the proceeds of the sale by the stockholders does
not make the sale one by the corporation.' 0 It is best, however, to avoid
this since it is possible that courts may say that the sale was for the
corporation's benefit and hence was corporate action. The rule which
permits escape from double taxation in this situation is a just one but
great care must be exercised to reap its benefits.
VICTOR S. BRYANT, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Amount in Controversy-
Effect of Counterclaim
Under Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure counter-
claims are divided into two classes, compulsory and permissive. A com-
pulsory counterclaim is one which must be pleaded if it arises out of
the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing
party's claim, does not require the presence of parties over whom the
court cannot acquire jurisdiction, and is not the subject matter of a
pending action.' A permissive counterclaim is any other claim against
an opposing party.2
"Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1946) (three
man committee appointed by stockholders; only one member of committee was
officer of corporation; liquidation resolution but no actual liquidation occurred
before negotiations began).
" Borall Corp. v. Commissioner, 167 F. 2d 865 (2d Cir. 1948); Louisville
Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1946); Burnet v. Lexington Ice
& Coal Co., 62 F. 2d 906 (4th Cir. 1933) (North Carolina federal case using what
is now N. C. GEN. STAT. §55-132 (1943) which provides that corporation is still
entity for winding up purposes for three years after dissolution, and holding that
even after dissolution, agent appointed by corporation for stockholders actually
corporation's trustee in liquidation and sale by him corporate sale).
" Louisville Trust Co. v. Glenn, 65 F. Supp. 193 (W. D. Ky. 1946).
1 Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(a). 'Fed. R. Civ. P. 13 (b).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Where jurisdiction of a district court is based on a general federal
question, that is, where there is no special provision in an act being to
the contrary, there is an additional requirement that the amount in
controversy exceed $3,000, exclusive of interest and costs. 3  Where
jurisdiction is based upon diversity of citizenship, again the amount in
controversy must exceed $3,000, exclusive of interests and costs.
4
Where a counterclaim is of the compulsory type, there seems to be
no question that when the jurisdictional elements are present as to the
plaintiff's claim, 5 the counterclaim is regarded as ancillary or auxiliary,6
and the court will decide the counterclaim even though the opposing
claim is denied on the merits.1 However, if the court has no jurisdiction
over the main transaction, even a compulsory counterclaim will be dis-
missed unless it has independent federal jurisdictional grounds.8
Where a counterclaim is of the permissive type, there must be in-
dependent grounds of federal jurisdiction or the counterclaim will be
dismissed. 9 It has been said that in the case of a set-off, which is de-
fined as a demand asserted to diminish or extinguish plaintiff's demand,
which arises out of a transaction different from that sued on, and which
must be liquidated and emerge from a contract or judgment, no inde-
pendent grounds or federal jurisdiction are necessary. 10
Aggregating the claims of both the plaintiff and defendant in order
to make up the amount in controversy presents a more difficult question.
In looking at this group of cases it is convenient to break the cases down
into (1) cases originating in federal courts, and (2) removal cases.
In cases originating in federal courts and where the defendant's
'28 U. S. C. §1331 (1948). '28 U. S. C. §1332 (1948).
'When a defendant files a claim against a third party who is brought in as a
defendant to this claim, the original defendant becomes a third party plaintiff, and
the third party is denominated a third party defendant. If the third party defendant
files a claim against the third party plaintiff, this claim is a counterclaim, and not
a cross-claim. 3 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcrIcE 13.06 (2d ed. 1948).
'Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U. S. 593 (1926) (decided under
old Federal Equity Rule 30); United States, to Use and for Benefit of Foster
Wheeler Corp. v. American Surety Co., 142 F. 2d 726 (2d Cir. 1944) ; Norton v.
Agricultural Bond & Credit Corp., 92 F. 2d 348 (10th Cir. 1937) ; New York
Life Ins. Co. v. Kaufman, 78 F. 2d 398 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 626
(1935).
Kirby v. American Soda Fountain Co., 194 U. S. 141 (1904) ; Home Ins. Co.
v. Trotter, 130 F. 2d 800 (8th Cir. 1942) ; Horwitz v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
80 F. 2d 295 (9th Cir. 1935).
' Goldstone v. Payne, 94 F. 2d 855 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 304 U. S. 585 (1938).
'Robinson Bros. v. Tygart Steel Products Co., 9 F. R. D. 468 (W. D. Pa.
1949); Jewish Consumptives Relief Society v. Rothfield, 9 F. R. D. 64 (S. D.
N. Y. 1949); Cusimano v. Falciglia, 6 F. R. D. 586 (S. D. N. Y. 1947); Marks
v. Spitz, 4 F. R. D. 348 (D. Mass. 1945) ; Donnelly Garment Co. v. Int'l Ladies
Garment Workers Union, 47 F. Supp. 67 (W. D. Mo. 1942). See Kantar v.
Garchell, 150 F. 2d 47, 49 (8th Cir. 1945) where the report does not state whether
or not the counterclaim was raised on appeal, and so may be dictum.
103 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 13.19 (2d ed. 1948). A dictum in Marks v.
Spitz, 4 F. R. D. 348 (D. Mass. 1945) supports this proposition, but Robinson
Bros. v. Tygart Steel Products Co., 9 F. R. D. 468 (W. D. Pa. 1949) is contra.
1950]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
counterclaim is itself in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the meager
authority on the point indicates that the federal court has jurisdiction
of the entire suit, regardless of plaintiff's claim. Roberts Mining and
Milling Co. v. Schrader" holds squarely that this is so. Dicta in
American Sheet and Tin Plate Co. v. Winzeler,12 Central Commercial
Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co.,'5 Ginsburg v. Pacific Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co.,14 and an implication in 0. J. Lewis Mercantile Co. v. Klep-
ner'1 also support the view that jurisdiction exists.
Where the defendant's counterclaim is not in excess of $3,000, ex-
clusive of interest and costs, but when added to the plaintiff's claim,
the total exceeds the minimum jurisdictional amount, the courts again
state that this should be allowed, but all of these statements can be clas-
sified as dicta. These dicta may be found in Kirby v. American Soda
Fountain Co.,' 6 Central Commercial Co. v. Jones-Dusenbury Co., and
American Sheet and Tin Plate Ca. v. Winzeler. Honw Life Insurance
Co. v. Sipp'7 is a case in point, usually cited as contra, but the peculiar
fact situation of that case coupled with language which the court used1
8
would seem to be more of a recognition of the rule, with an exception
being made. In Lee v. Continental Insurance Co.19 there was a square
holding that the amount of the counterclaim could be added to the claim
of the plaintiff to make up the jurisdictional amount. This case origi-
nated in "a court of Utah territory" and was removed to the federal cir-
cuit court when Utah was admitted as a state.
In certain types of removal cases the effect of a counterclaim is
quite clear. Although before 1941 there was a sharp and irreconcilable
split of authority on the point, 20 Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. v. Sheets
21
settled the proposition that if a non-resident plaintiff sued in a state
court, for whatever amount, and defendant pleaded a counterclaim in
excess of the jurisdictional amount, the plaintiff could not remove, be-
"95 F. 2d 522 (9th Cir. 1938).
u227 Fed. 321, 324 (N. D. Ohio 1915).
'3251 Fed. 13, 19 (7th Cir. 1918). 1, 69 F. 2d 97, 98 (2d Cir. 1934).
"See 176 Fed. 343, 346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 216 U. S. 620 (1909), where
the court said that the defendant invoked the jurisdiction of the court for its own
benefit by putting in a counterclaim, and was estopped to deny jurisdiction. This
case has ,been criticized for its holding by Judge Dobie in an article, Jurisdictional
Amount in the United States District Court, 38 HARv. L. Ray. 733 (1925), and
by the court in Home Life Ins. Co. v. Sipp, 11 F. 2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926), on the
grounds that the cases cited to sustain the holding will not do so.
10194 U. S. 141, 144 (1904). " 11 F. 2d 474 (3d Cir. 1926).
18 "The counterclaim in this case--$423--is not in itself equal to the jurisdic-
tional amount; nor when added to the plaintiff's demand [an even $3,000] does it
raise the total to the amount the statute requires, for the reason that the counter-
claim was pleaded not to recover anything from the plaintiff but merely to be
deducted from any amount that might be found due the plaintiff, and particularly
to be deducted from an amount which the defendant admits it owes."
1274 Fed. 424 (C. C. D. Utah 1896).
2o For a collection of cases see 28 U. S. C. A. §71, n. 668 (1926).
21313 U. S. 100 (1941).
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cause he was not a defendant within the meaning of the removal statutes.
It is equally clear that the defendant being sued in his home state
cannot remove, because the statute explicitly limits the right of removal
to a nonresident defendant or defendants. 22 By the weight of authority
a non-resident defendant who pleads a counterclaim in a state court in
excess of the jurisdictional amount cannot remove when the plaintiff
claims only $3,000 or less. The courts take the view that it is the demand
in the complaint which fixes the amount in controversy, and a counter-
claim is not to be considered.
23
When both original and removal suits are considered, the decisions
do not warrant the statements frequently made by writers that it is
generally held that a counterclaim can be used to make up the jurisdic-
tional amount. 24 Most of the decisions cited as permitting such a
proposition are only dicta.
2 5
In conclusion this writer suggests that the existing practice of de-
ciding compulsory counterclaims when there is jurisdiction over the
plaintiff's complaint, regardless of the amount of the counterclaim,
should be maintained. In addition the effect of a counterclaim upon
the jurisdictional amount should be made clear by an amendment to
Rule 13 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The simplest rule,
and one which would be in line with the plaintiff's viewpoint theory, as
well as the policy of restricting federal jurisdiction, would be a require-
ment that plaintiff's complaint show that an amount exceeding $3,000
exclusive of interest and costs, be in controversy, and no counterclaim
would be considered to make up that amount. No distinction should
be made between original and removal jurisdiction.
BASIL SHERRILL.
Federal Jurisdiction-Amount in Controversy-Unregistered
Trade-marks and Trade Names
Where the owner of a trade-mark has registered it pursuant to the
Federal Trade-Mark statutes, no jurisdictional amount is required in
an action for infringement in the federal courts.1 In addition, where a
=228 U. S. C. §1441 (b) (1948).
"' Gates v. Union Cent. Life Ins. Co., 56 F. Supp. 149 (E. D. N. Y. 1944);
Haney v. Wilcheck, 38 F. Supp. 345 (W. D. Va. 1941) ; Harley v. Firemen's Fund
Ins. Co., 245 Fed. 471 (W. D. Wash. 1913) ; Bennett v. Devine, 45 Fed. 705 (C. C.
S. D. Iowa 1891); La Montagne v. T. W. Harvey Lumber Co., 44 Fed. 645
(C. C. E. D. Wis. 1891). Contra: Wheatley v. Martin, 62 F. Supp. 109 (W. D.
Ark. 1945) ; Clarkson v. Manson, 4 Fed. 257 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1880). Mackay
v. Uinta Development Co., 229 U. S. 173 (1913) senmble.
SSIMIINs, FEDERAL PRAcTicE §132 (3d ed. 1938); MONTGOMERY'S MANUAL OF
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROcEDURE §94 (4th ed. 1942) ; Shulman and Jaeger-
man, Some Jurisdictional Limitations on Federal Procedure, 45 YALE L. J. 393
(1936).
"'Note, 25 MINN. L. Rav. 356 (1941).
28.U. S. C. §1338(a) (1948).
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